Let’s start with Rafael Correa. It’s a fact that the raid which killed “Raúl Reyes” and his companions was a violation of Ecuador’s sovereignty and he is entitled, even obliged, to be angry about it. There is nothing to criticise, therefore, in his breaking of diplomatic relations with Bogotá and rejection of the half-hearted apologies of the Colombian government. He would do well though not to get too carried away with righteous indignation especially if it leads him to talking gibberish like this,
They [the Colombian government] accuse us of protecting the FARC because they found one camp in our territory while in Colombia itself the same group controls huge areas.
He ought also to bear in mind that a wise President would see to it that armed groups seeking refuge from the legitimate government of a neighbouring state are not allowed to slip across to Ecuador whenever they feel like it. The presence of FARC units in Ecuador erodes its sovereignty as surely as Colombian government incursions do.
Uribe gambled when he gave the order to attack the FARC contingent led by “Reyes” on the Ecuadorian side of the border. The first part of the bet has already paid off: “Reyes” is dead and apart from the blow thus produced to the FARC’s prestige it’s likely that the raid will have significant operational benefits for the Colombian security forces. Their principle enemy will no longer be able to slip across whatever border is closest when the going gets tough, confident that they won’t be pursued, pose for pictures
and later rejoin the fight at a time and place of their choosing. From now on it’s longer marches, tighter security and less rest for the FARC.
The result of the second part of Uribe’s bet still isn’t in. It is that the regional and international reaction to the raid will blow over relatively quickly and won’t redound to the benefit of Chávez and thus to the FARC. While it’s too early to tell for sure, I think this part of his bet will pay off too; it’s doubtful that Argentina or Brazil are going to allow themselves to be drawn beyond verbal condemnations, he enjoys the support of the United States and couldn’t care less what the French think. As well as all this he has the support of the bulk of Colombians; even if they don’t like him much they can’t wait to see the defeat of the FARC.
It’s hard to know what more to say about Chávez. His country’s borders weren’t breached and he was really under no obligation to do anything other than join the round of ritual diplomatic condemnations and then shut up. Had he done so he would have allowed the attention of the world to focus on the gravity of what Colombia actually did; launch an air assault on the territory of a neighbour with whom it is not at war and then send infantry in afterwards territory to retrieve the bodies of the dead and their possessions. Instead, he has opted to rave about not letting Colombia become a new Israel and engage in military gesture mongering. Chávez’ ego, inability to control his tongue and love of the spotlight are all working to Uribe’s benefit in this crisis.
