Hamas

Some thoughts with regard to an article about Hamas in the current online edition of the LRB.

Hamas’s action was conducted with the aim of removing the influence of just one of Fatah’s security forces in Gaza, the militia controlled by Muhammad Dahlan, Abbas’s national security adviser. Hamas has insisted that this has not been a conflict with Fatah in general, and it was notable that neither the Palestinian security forces – effectively the Palestinian ‘army’ – nor the police in Gaza were targets of the recent violence.

This version of recent events in Gaza is sharply contradicted by an independent journalist who was present throughout the fighting. His view suggests that the conflict started as a result of a series of isolated events snowballing into a bigger clash and makes clear that Palestinian security forces were indeed attacked. The mystery is why they didn’t make a stiffer fight of it.

On the contrary, the leadership of Hamas – like their colleagues in Hizbullah – are preparing for the long hot summer of regional conflict that inevitably lies ahead.

More plausibly, moderate movements such as Hamas and Hizbullah will encourage popular resistance while also striving to maintain their political presence.

Hamas has grave limitations as a national liberation movement, religious obscurantism and rampant racism in its public statements for example, but it is undoubtedly a key actor in the struggle for self-determination for the Palestinians. Hizbullah rules a mini-state in south Lebanon, is in thrall to the Iranian government and is an important actor in a larger polity which – the Shabaa Farms red herring aside – has no claims against Israel. So it’s hard to see a serious basis for identifying Hamas with Hizbullah and even less for talking of the latter “encouraging popular resistance”. Resistance against what?

It (Hamas) believes that good governance now, and the unity it will bring, is the path to a Palestinian state.

If the term “good governance” is understood to include a monopoly of the use force then this is surely correct. However, the extent to which good governance is compatible with a policy of endless armed struggle against a resourceful and tenacious enemy may well be doubted.

Throughout the article there is unspoken but palpable identification by the author with Hamas. In principle, there’s nothing wrong with that. However, this position seems to blind him to the possibility that Hamas might have erred at any point in during the recent events in Gaza or at any other time. In particular, there is no consideration of whether Hamas’ refusal to recognize the existence of its principle enemy is bringing Palestinian statehood closer or pushing it farther away.

The last thing the Palestinians and the Israelis need is foreign friends who are blind to all their errors and refuse to criticise them for fear of giving comfort to their enemies. Israel has its share of adulators, particularly in the USA but overall, it would be difficult to argue that its policies are short of critics of all kinds, both within its borders and beyond them. Those to support the creation of a Palestinian state have the most pressing duty to ask whether the methods being used to bring this about have any chance of achieving their goal. Israel can probably survive its adulators, the Palestinians can afford no such luxuries.